An Interfaith Diplomacy and Multi-Track Conflict Prevention Strategy in Bangsamoro (2025–2026): Governing Peace from Below
Keywords:
Interfaith Diplomacy, New Wars, Multi-Track Diplomacy, Bangsamoro, Conflict PreventionAbstract
In contemporary armed conflicts, internal state violence is becoming more common. It is marked by dispersed participants, mobilization driven by identification, and localized instability. Within the New Wars framework, these dynamics manifest as horizontal conflicts—intermittent communal violence integrated into daily social interactions and largely disregarded by state-centric security paradigms. This study contextualizes the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) within international discourse on New Wars and horizontal conflict by analyzing peace management during a pivotal post-war electoral transition (2025–2026). This article examines interfaith diplomacy as a grassroots peace governance mechanism, serving as a multi-track (Track I,II, and VII) conflict prevention strategy, with a focus on the Tri-People Peace and Development Agenda. This theory posits that interfaith actors serve as significant non-state diplomatic agents who influence community norms, alleviate horizontal tensions, and enhance electoral stability, alongside their informal function as peacebuilders. The study improves our understanding of peace governance by connecting religious participation to the reform of sub-national government, surpassing formal institutions.
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