

The Role Of Multinational Security Support In Conflict Recovery Haiti In 2023-2024

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ABSTRACT

Haiti has experienced an escalation of violence caused by criminal gangs since the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in 2021. The Multinational Security Support, a coalition of forces from several countries, has been deployed to Haiti to restore and maintain stability. This research employs a qualitative method and aims to analyze the roles and challenges faced by the Multinational Security Support (MSS) in carrying out its mission in Haiti during 2023-2024, using Responsibility to Protect and security regime as conceptual frameworks. The findings reveal that MSS has conducted its mission in accordance with the principles of the Responsibility to Protect, especially the Responsibility to React although MSS has yet to yield significant results. The findings also indicates that MSS operation did not fully act in accordance with the prevailing norms and principles (security regime), visible in lack of coordination and clear regulations and procedures. The challenges faced by the MSS are complex, including disruptions from criminal gangs during the mission and logistical and financial issues, such as the delayed deployment of promised troops and slow disbursement of funds.

Key Words: Haiti, Multinational Security Support; Criminal Gangs; Responsibility to Protect

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1. INTRODUCTION

Differences in interests and positions (incompatibility of interests) often lead to disputes and conflicts. However, not all disputes and conflicts are resolved peacefully (Wallenstein, 2007; Eliza, Heryandi, & Syofyan 2015). Conflicts can be divided into two types, namely external conflicts, which occur between one country and another, and internal conflicts, which occur between the government and organizations or groups within a country (Eliza, Heryandi, & Syofyan 2015). Similarly, SIPRI divides conflicts into three types: interstate, intrastate, and extrastate. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a decline in external conflicts and an increase in internal conflicts (SIPRI, 2021).

The Republic of Haiti, a country on the American continent that shares a border with the Dominican Republic, is experiencing internal conflict involving criminal gangs. The conflict began with the security crisis that followed the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 (Center For Preventive Action 2024). Ariel Henry was then appointed Prime Minister in an effort to stabilize the country, which had been on the brink of unrest since the assassination (News Wires 2021).

In 2022, criminal gangs, such as the alliance of nine gangs in the capital called G9 and Gpèp, increasingly demonstrated their influence and power in Haiti by carrying out various criminal activities, such as kidnapping, sexual violence, and shootings against civilians (Pellegrini & Arocha 2022). This prompted the Haitian government to request the deployment of an International Specialized Force to strengthen the efforts of the Haitian National Police to restore stability and security (Security Council

Report 2024b). The situation in Haiti worsened in 2023 and became very unfavorable, especially in Port-au-Prince, as 80 percent of the area was controlled by criminal gangs (Le-Cour-Grandmaison, Oliveira, & Herbert 2024). One of the notorious criminal gangs controlling the Haitian capital is G9, led by Jimmy Chérizier, also known as 'Barbecue', a former member of the Haitian National Police (UN News 2024c).

Taking humanitarian considerations into account, on October 2, 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) finally adopted Resolution 2699 at its 9430th meeting in New York, United States (UN 2023). Resolution 2699 authorizes the implementation of a non-UN Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti. This resolution was issued at the request of stakeholders to the UNSC for the deployment of Multinational Security Support to Haiti in 2022, which was then initiated by UN Secretary-General António Guterres in 2023 (Security Council Report 2024a).

Previously, the mission to Haiti could not be carried out due to many considerations, such as whether this mission would violate human rights, as was the case with the previous mission deployed to Haiti, namely the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH)/United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. The next consideration was the need for UN Security Council approval so that the mission would not be considered foreign intervention. Thus, when Resolution 2699 was adopted by the UN Security Council, the countries that supported the mission had no further hesitation in carrying out the mission in Haiti. In particular, the Kenyan government, which had previously carried out missions in Haiti, led the deployment of troops to support the Haitian National Police in the face of instability and insecurity caused by criminal gangs and to restore security in Haiti. Kenya became the leader of the Multinational Security Support mission after signing a defense agreement with the United States in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, on September 25, 2023, ahead of the adoption of Resolution 2699 (Aljazeera 2023).

This article examines the conflict in Haiti and the role of the MSS for several reasons. First, the conflict in Haiti is a complex internal conflict involving criminal gangs. Although it is an internal issue, the conflict has an international dimension involving international forces. This condition encourages a more in-depth exploration of the conflict. Second, many studies and media outlets have raised this issue but have not discussed the conflict in Haiti in detail from the theoretical perspective of international relations. Third, 2023-2024 was chosen as the focus of analysis because during this period the conflict in Haiti reached an unprecedented level of severity. The increase in violence triggered by the anarchic actions of criminal gangs became increasingly uncontrollable, prompting the formation of the MSS, whose troops came from various countries.

Given the complexity of the conflict in Haiti and the Multinational Security Support's efforts to restore security in 2023-2024, this paper attempts to answer two research questions. First, how does the Multinational Security Support implement the Responsibility to Protect? And second, what challenges are faced?

2. METHODOLOGY

This article uses qualitative research. According to Moleong (2018), qualitative research aims to understand phenomena experienced by research subjects, such as behavior, perceptions, motivations, and actions, holistically by describing them in words and language in a specific natural context, using various natural methods. The data sources used in this article are primary data such as official UN reports, international organization reports, and think tank reports. Secondary data is sourced from various literature. The data collection technique used is a literature study, which is the activity of collecting information and data from various available materials, such as reference books, previous research results,

articles, notes, and journals related to the issue being studied (Sari & Asmendri 2020). The data analysis technique used in writing this article is descriptive qualitative, which is a method that focuses on the natural setting as a whole, with humans as the main instrument, inductive data analysis, and prioritizes process over results (Abudssamad 2021).

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept is derived from the Humanitarian Intervention concept issued by the United Nations (UN) in 2005 as a form of global obligation to end the worst forms of violence and persecution that continue to occur. This concept emphasizes that a country's sovereignty not only serves to protect the country from foreign intervention, but more than that, it includes the country's obligation to ensure the welfare of its citizens. Thus, the primary responsibility of the state is to protect its citizens, not external entities. This is in line with what Bosco (2013) stated, that the Responsibility to Protect is about the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens, and this is what makes the state have a primary obligation to protect the safety of its people.

In addition, there is also a 'residual responsibility' borne by the wider international community, which arises when a country is clearly unwilling or unable to fulfill its obligation to protect its citizens, or when that country is the main perpetrator of crimes or atrocities. If a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, that responsibility shifts to the international community, which uses diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means to protect those citizens (United Nations n.d; ICISS, 2001).

The Responsibility to Protect concept aims to create a protection system involving diplomacy, law enforcement, economic sanctions, and peace operations that are usually agreed upon by local parties, although sometimes enforced (Bellamy 2009). International assistance is also provided to help countries build responsible sovereignty and adequate capacity. The Responsibility to Protect concept has three important components, namely responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild (ICISS, 2001). The R2P concept is used in this study to examine the extent to which the MSS fulfilled its responsibilities in the recovery from the conflict in Haiti.

B. Security Regime

John Ruggie in Joyner (2000) sees regimes as a set of expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energy, and financial commitments that have been accepted by a group of countries. Meanwhile, according to Krasner (1982), international regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that become the meeting point of actors' expectations in certain issue areas. Crawford (1994) provides a more detailed explanation of regimes according to Stephen Krasner, namely rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that are considered to reduce the impact of international anarchy, the absence of a sovereign authority to maintain peace and enforce international agreements.

According to Jervis (1982), a security regime encompasses principles, rules, and norms that enable countries to restrain their actions with the confidence that other countries will reciprocate. This concept encompasses more than just norms and expectations that support cooperation, but also includes types of cooperation that do not focus solely on short-term interests. Thus, in the context of this paper, the security regime is understood as the principles, rules, and norms that govern various aspects related to security that underlie and guide MSS operations.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Implementation of Responsibility to Protect in Multinational Security Support (MSS) Operations

The surge in violence in Haiti following the assassination of Jovenel Moise has resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, with the numbers continuing to rise as the situation worsens. Not only has it caused loss of life, but the escalation of violence has also had a significant impact on the daily lives of the people. In March 2024, Haiti experienced a wave of organized attacks by armed gangs, which simultaneously targeted the country's key infrastructure (News Wires 2024). Vital infrastructure, especially in the capital Port-au-Prince, was targeted and suffered serious damage. Freight operations in Port-au-Prince were severely disrupted by attacks on port infrastructure and ships, resulting in repeated suspensions of operations at various facilities, limiting the distribution of aid and exacerbating existing conditions (RiskIntelligence 2024). The most alarming aspect of the attacks on infrastructure in Haiti was the break-in at the country's two largest prisons, which resulted in approximately 4,600 prisoners escaping (AFP News 2024).

SIPRI (2025) noted that gang violence had killed 5,000 people, and ONCHR gave a slightly higher figure of 5,601 cases, an increase of more than 1,000 cases compared to 2023, despite the deployment of Multinational Security Support in mid-2024 (OHCHR 2025). By the end of August 2024, the UN recorded more than 3,400 people killed and 1,600 others injured as a result of violence committed by criminal gangs in Haiti since January (UN News 2024b). At the end of December 2024, three people were also killed in an attack by criminal gangs in Haiti, which targeted journalists, police, and medical staff during a briefing announcing the reopening of the country's largest public hospital (Rocha & Lukiv 2024). This tragic incident took place at a hospital in Port-au-Prince, where two journalists and a police officer were reportedly killed by gunfire, while several others were injured. The mass killings at the end of 2024 prompted the Haitian government to issue a public statement promising to take firm action against the gangs involved in the incident (Blaise 2024b).

Table 1.
Number of deaths, injuries and kidnapping in Haiti, 20023 and 2024

Year	Injuries	Death	Kidnapping
2023	902	2.439	952
2024	2.212	5.601	1.500

Data compiled from different sources

In addition, the brutality of criminal gangs hampered MSS operations. On the night of December 6, 2024, Monel ‘Mikano’ Felix ordered about 300 members of his gang to carry out a brutal hunt. They raided about 10 gangs in the Port-au-Prince area and forcibly dragged victims out of their homes. A total of 134 men and 73 women were killed in those six days, adding to the long list of victims of violence in an increasingly uncontrollable situation (Lemonde 2025). These incidents illustrate the extraordinary scale of violence and show that efforts to control the situation are becoming increasingly difficult, given the enormous impact on civilians and an already weak security system.

Seeing the increasing number of victims and the ongoing conflict in Haiti, the Multinational Security Support Force deployed on June 25, 2024, serves as an embodiment of the Responsibility to Protect. The international community's responsibility is to react, as reflected in international action to respond to the increasing gang violence in Haiti by adopting Resolution 2699, which allows for the deployment of the MSS to Haiti. The MSS is part of a deployment of troops from eight countries spread

throughout the capital to try to wrest control of the city from dozens of criminal gangs that have attacked police stations, freed prisoners, and killed with impunity (Robles & Dahir 2024).

MSS troops patrolled areas around the international airport, which had recently reopened after being closed for nearly three months due to escalating gang violence. The reopening of the airport signifies the MSS's success in improving security in the region and facilitating the restoration of vital infrastructure in Haiti (VoA Indonesia 2024). Armored vehicles also patrolled the area around the national palace and other parts of Port-au-Prince, carrying MSS troops and Haitian National Police (RFI 2024).

The deployed MSS not only assists in the direct security of vital infrastructure but also plays a broader role in strengthening the Haitian National Police as the institution responsible for domestic security. The limited number of personnel, consisting of only about 9,000 active personnel in 2023, has left the Haitian National Police overwhelmed in the face of escalating violence amid an increasingly uncontrollable situation (Buschschlüter 2024a). The gangs' possession of weapons gives them an advantage in confrontations with the government and civilians. Criminal gangs obtain their weapons through the illegal arms trade (UN News 2024a).

MSS plays a role in strengthening the capacity of the Haitian National Police by providing intensive training to the Haitian National Police, supplying various advanced equipment that can be used to fight criminal gangs, and strengthening operational tactics that can be used when dealing with these criminal gangs. This support enables the Haitian National Police to be more effective in dealing with threats, whether in terms of routine patrols, raids, or guarding facilities that are targeted by criminal gangs.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) also adopted a resolution on October 18, 2024, imposing an arms embargo on Haiti. The arms embargo was imposed as part of the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect concept, which serves as a tool to protect civilians from mass violence, including genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. By restricting the flow of weapons, it is hoped that international pressure will encourage a peaceful resolution to the conflict and prevent widespread human rights violations in Haiti.

Previously, in October 2023, the UN Security Council also approved an embargo on the shipment of small arms and ammunition to all regions of Haiti, not just to gang leaders. However, these embargo sanctions did not have a significant impact on these criminal gangs because they still obtained ammunition and weapons illegally, smuggled from the United States and the Dominican Republic (VoA News 2024). Most of the firearms and ammunition originating from the United States and smuggled into Haiti are usually obtained from licensed retail stores, gun shows, or pawn shops, and then shipped by sea (UN News 2024a).

The MSS focuses on strengthening the legal framework and rules governing law enforcement and national security. This regime includes measures to maintain regional security, protect human rights, and ensure that law enforcement agencies such as the Haitian National Police can operate effectively despite challenging circumstances.

The MSS, operating under an international mandate, works to ensure that security operations in Haiti are carried out in accordance with humanitarian principles and norms and human rights. The deployment of the MSS is expected to avoid human rights violations against the Haitian people, as was done by forces deployed to Haiti in previous missions, namely MINUSTAH. Although MINUSTAH forces received praise from the UN for their success in creating a stable political transition, a major

problem arose in the implementation of the mission, namely cases of sexual abuse involving MINUSTAH forces against the Haitian people, especially children aged 12 to 15 (Dodd 2017).

B. Challenges Faced by Multinational Security Support

The deployment and intervention of foreign forces, a result of past experiences with foreign intervention and occupation, is often viewed with concern by some Haitians, despite the awareness that security stability is very high (Buschschlüter 2024b). This also has an impact on the deployment of MSS personnel to Haiti.

One of the most vocal figures in responding to this situation is Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, leader of the G9 gang, who accuses Ariel Henry of attempting to strengthen his power by inviting foreign security personnel to Haiti. Jimmy Chérizier and his gang view this move as a form of external intervention that threatens Haiti's sovereignty and exacerbates the already chaotic socio-political conditions (Buschschlüter 2024b). These accusations highlight the growing tension between the government and internal groups that feel threatened by the presence of international forces, adding to the complexity of the situation Haiti faces in its efforts to achieve stability and peace.

Another challenge facing the MSS is the destruction of various important infrastructure in the country. One of the MSS's mandates is to protect infrastructure (SIPRI, 2025). Criminal gangs have taken control of almost the entire city, resulting in the collapse of the remaining health services and worsening food insecurity in the community (Buschschlüter 2025). Criminal gangs in Haiti have launched a series of attacks on infrastructure, including closing airports, looting ports, government buildings, and shops, and attacking nearly a dozen police stations. These actions have not only shaken the country's security system, but also disrupted government operations and reduced the state's ability to meet the basic needs of its citizens. In addition, criminal gangs have blocked major roads, hindering access to transportation and causing disruptions to the supply of food and other essential goods (New York Times 2024).

In mid-2024, the MSS was deployed to Haiti to assist the Haitian National Police and restore stability and security in Haiti. However, brutality and the influence of criminal gangs continue to dominate Haiti, especially in the capital. This shows that the challenges faced by the MSS are not insignificant. Although the international community has made efforts to take responsibility for what is happening in Haiti by allowing the deployment of the MSS, the dominance of criminal gangs in Haiti is stronger, leading to a significant increase in the number of fatalities, injuries, and kidnappings in 2024. This shows that the MSS, which arrived in Haiti in mid-2024, has not been able to prevent violence committed by criminal gangs against civilians, making the deployment of additional MSS personnel urgently needed.

The small number of personnel posed another challenge for the MSS. The mission was originally planned to involve 2,500 officers and soldiers, but by the end of June 2024, only 400 Kenyan police officers had been deployed, most of whom had to work independently to support the Haitian National Police, which lacked personnel and weapons to deal with armed gangs that were well-trained and very familiar with the streets of the capital and almost completely controlled the area (Mohor, Macon, & Kiage 2025). This is in contrast to the previous mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, where peacekeeping forces in Haiti at the time played a role in restoring law and order through anti-crime operations and providing manpower when needed, which was particularly useful during national elections, where peacekeeping forces distributed ballots and equipment, as well as in post-disaster cleanup efforts. In fact, 7,600 military personnel, 2,091 police officers, and 777 international volunteers played a vital role after the 2010 earthquake that devastated the entire country (Figueroa n.d.). This shows a significant difference in the

number of troops deployed between MINUSTAH and Multinational Security Support in 2024. The lack of personnel in MSS operations is a serious challenge (SIPRI, 2025).

On the other hand, the mission operates in a complex and unstable environment, where criminal gangs take refuge in densely populated urban areas, making security operations difficult without putting civilians at risk. Therefore, the mission needs to take a careful approach to protect civilians while also protecting its personnel. While patrolling downtown Port-au-Prince, the brutal impact of gang violence is evident. The Multinational Security Support Force from Kenya traverses the once-bustling but now-deserted streets of the capital in heavy armored personnel carriers (APCs). Shops and houses along their route were tightly shut. Burned-out cars and piles of rubble formed high barricades on side streets, the result of gangs' attempts to block access to the area (Al-Maghafi & Dyer 2024).

Kenya has not yet sent the promised additional 600 officers to Haiti. Although they have completed their training, the Kenyan troops were initially scheduled to depart at the end of November 2024. However, that deadline has passed, and the Kenyan troops are still in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Benin, which also offered the largest contingent of up to 2,000 soldiers, has postponed the deployment of its troops since September 2024, arguing that the situation in Haiti requires a military approach, while Benin is unwilling to have its soldiers take orders from the police. On the other hand, six Bahamian military officers sent to Port-au-Prince as an advance team have received permission from their government to withdraw voluntarily, allowing them to leave the mission if they feel unsafe (Mohor et al. 2025).

This indicates a failure to implement the principles contained in the Security Regime, particularly with regard to the obligation of states to ensure the protection of troops involved in international missions. As part of the Security Regime and Responsibility to Protect, states involved in MSS missions must ensure that their troops are protected from threats that could endanger their safety, and implement clear and firm procedures for handling crisis situations.

Granting military officers permission to withdraw, which can be done unilaterally, illustrates an imbalance in the implementation of the mission and a lack of coordination between the countries sending troops and the parties responsible for the mission. Furthermore, this step reveals weaknesses in the Security Regime framework, where there should be clearer rules and more structured procedures to ensure that missions involving international forces can be carried out safely, effectively, and sustainably, while maintaining the stability and security of countries affected by conflict.

On October 3, 2024, El Salvador officially signed an agreement to join the MSS mission to support security operations in Haiti. Although the exact date of the troop deployment has not been announced, officials stated that Salvadoran troops will assist the Haitian National Police with aerial surveillance, medical assistance, and street patrols. On September 24, 2024, Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo announced before the UN General Assembly that the Central American country would send 150 military police to assist Haiti in combating violent gangs. However, Bernardo Arévalo did not mention when the troops would be deployed (Oliveira 2024).

On the other hand, the United States continues to provide logistical support and equipment to the Haitian National Police and Multinational Security Support. This assistance includes three dozen MRAP vehicles, materials for base repairs, MEDEVAC services, and equipment such as radios, night vision goggles, drones, computers, ammunition, and riot control equipment. However, there are no reports of combat vehicles being sent.

The United States military has sent dozens of MaxxPro (MRAP) vehicles designed for protection against landmines and attacks to Haiti. However, these vehicles have limitations because they are not tanks. They are designed to transport troops, but are often used in combat and are vulnerable to fire when

gangs throw Molotov cocktails. In fact, in October 2024, half of these vehicles were rendered unusable because criminal gangs shot at the tires, which were not made of reinforced rubber.

Looking at the reality on the ground, the situation shows that the number of Haitian National Police personnel is still very limited, far fewer than the growing number of criminal gangs. Although the presence of international forces from the MSS mission provides support, the main challenge is the imbalance in the number of troops, which is insufficient to deal with the increasingly organized gangs. Meanwhile, these gangs continue to expand their influence by recruiting new members from the Haitian population, especially among unemployed, desperate, and vulnerable young people.

In addition to countries willing to send troops from their countries to contribute to conflict recovery in Haiti, there are also countries willing to provide financial assistance even though they do not participate in sending their troops to join the Multinational Security Support mission. Funding is one form of intervention or action that can be taken by authorized or related parties, such as governments, international organizations, or humanitarian agencies. These funds are typically used to support programs designed to protect populations threatened or affected by crises, such as conflicts, natural disasters, or other threats.

In addition, the funds can also be used for recovery programs that include infrastructure rehabilitation, health services, education, and economic assistance, so that the affected communities can return to a more stable and secure situation. In this case, the funds are used to support the Multinational Security Support mission, which is designed to protect civilians from the threat of criminal gangs in Haiti and to restore stability and security to the country. The MSS mission requires approximately \$600 million to fund the mission for a full year (Merancourt & Coletta 2024). However, as of June 10, 2024, the funds collected from the United States, France, and Canada amounted to \$21 million (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2024). These funds will be used to deploy troops to Haiti, to finance logistics and all types of equipment needed during the mission, and to train MSS troops.

The United States has pledged to allocate at least \$380 million in support of Multinational Security Support (Congressional Research Service 2024). On October 2, 2023, following the passage of Resolution 2699, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that \$100 million in foreign aid would be provided to Multinational Security Support, plus another \$100 million from the Department of Defense budget for operational support. In addition, Antony Blinken proposed an additional \$33 million for what he called emergency humanitarian assistance (Al Mayadeen English 2024).

In March 2024, the Department of Defense's contribution increased to \$200 million (Congressional Research Service 2024). In addition, President Biden, through his presidential drawdown authority, approved the transfer of at least \$70 million worth of military equipment and services from US stocks to Haiti, with \$10 million provided in March and \$60 million in April. Both Haiti and Kenya are also likely to receive additional funding from the Department of Defense. U.S. support for the MSS aims to complement bilateral programs designed to train and strengthen the Haitian National Police, as well as assistance through the UN Basket Fund involving many donor countries, one of which is Canada. In fiscal year 2023, the United States allocated \$230.9 million to Haiti, including \$45 million through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program, which is primarily focused on supporting the Haitian National Police (Congressional Research Service 2024).

The UN Trust Fund for Multinational Security Support has received voluntary contributions totaling \$67 million from member states, including Canada (\$45 million), the United States (\$15 million), France and Spain (\$3 million each), Italy (\$360,000), and Turkey (\$50,000) out of a total commitment of \$84 million that has been pledged (Blaise 2024a). However, this amount is still far from sufficient to ensure that Multinational Security Support can carry out its mandate effectively. Therefore, the Secretary-

General continues to urge Member States to provide additional financial support for the success of the Multinational Security Support mission (UN News 2024b).

In addition to the United States, Canada and France also contributed funds to facilitate the Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti. In 2024, Canada sent 150 soldiers to Jamaica to train approximately 300 security forces participating in the mission (Merancourt & Coletta 2024). Canada also intends to add \$5.7 million to the United Nations Trust Fund supporting the Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti. This is in addition to the \$80.5 million announced in February 2024. This additional funding will directly support the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission led by Kenya. Canada is also working with other countries contributing to the Multinational Security Support mission to provide training to deployed personnel and establish mechanisms to prevent human rights violations, including gender-based and sexual violence.

In addition to the \$5.7 million announced on June 26, 2024, Canada had previously allocated \$12.5 million to support three projects aimed at strengthening the Haitian National Police and improving security conditions for civilians in Haiti (Canada.ca 2024). This includes \$5 million through the Canadian Commercial Corporation to support the Special Tactical Training Program for the Haitian National Police, \$4 million for the Organization of American States in the Land and Sea-Based Trade Security Program in Haiti, and \$3.5 million for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in the Container Control Program in Haiti. These three projects are funded through a \$100 million investment for the Haitian National Police previously announced by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in March 2023.

The sustainability of the MSS mission is highly dependent on adequate and consistent funding. However, reliance on voluntary contributions from member countries poses significant challenges, and in the MSS operation in Haiti, there have been funding constraints (SIPRI, 2025). The slow disbursement of promised funds and the limited number of contributing countries further exacerbate the financial conditions faced by the mission. These challenges reflect the difficulties often experienced by regional and subregional missions that depend on trust funds.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Since being deployed to Haiti, Multinational Security Support (MSS) has played a role in securing vital infrastructure, such as ports, airports, police stations, and the presidential palace. MSS has carried out its Responsibility to Protect, specifically its Responsibility to React, but has not been able to carry out its Responsibility to Prevent and Protect, as evidenced by the increasing number of casualties. In addition, the Security Regime has not been fully implemented by the MSS, as evidenced by the lack of coordination and clear rules and procedures.

From mid to late 2024, the MSS's efforts to resolve the conflict and maintain security and stability in Haiti were hampered by the complexity of the challenges faced. The death toll from criminal gangs in 2024 reached 5,601, higher than in previous years. This shows that the effectiveness of the MSS's role has not been felt significantly in Haiti, despite efforts to restore peace and maintain security and stability in Haiti.

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